 NAME 
	
#nameNAME 	
#descriptionDESCRIPTION 	
#errorsERRORS 	
#filesFILES 	
#see_alsoSEE ALSO 
NAME 
AppArmor kernel enhancement to confine programs to a limited set of resources.
DESCRIPTION 
AppArmor is a kernel enhancement to confine programs to a limited set
of resources. AppArmor's unique security model is to bind access control
attributes to programs rather than to users.
AppArmor confinement is provided via profiles loaded into the kernel
via apparmor_parser(8), typically through the 
/etc/init.d/boot.apparmorSysV initscript, which is used like this:
        # /etc/init.d/boot.apparmor start
        # /etc/init.d/boot.apparmor stop
        # /etc/init.d/boot.apparmor restart
        # /etc/init.d/boot.apparmor kill
AppArmor can operate in two modes: enforcement, and complain or learning:
enforcement -  Profiles loaded in enforcement mode will result 
in enforcement of the policy defined in the profile as well as reporting 
policy violation attempts to syslogd.
complain - Profiles loaded in  complain mode will not enforce policy.  
Instead, it will report policy violation attempts. This mode is convenient for 
developing profiles. To manage complain mode for individual profiles the 
utilities /usr/bin/complain and /usr/bin/enforce can be used. 
These utilities take a program name as an argument.
Profiles are traditionally stored in files in /etc/apparmor.d/under filenames with the convention of replacing the 
/ in pathnames
with 
. (except for the root /) so profiles are easier to manage
(e.g. the 
/usr/sbin/sshd profile would be named usr.sbin.sshd).
Profiles are applied to a process at exec(3) time (as seen through the
execve(2) system call); an already running process cannot be confined.
However, once a profile is loaded for a program, that program will be
confined on the next exec(3).
AppArmor supports the Linux kernel's securityfs filesystem, and makes
available the list of the profiles currently loaded; to mount the
filesystem:
        # mount -tsecurityfs securityfs /sys/kernel/security
        $ cat /sys/kernel/security/apparmor/profiles
        /usr/bin/mutt
        /usr/bin/gpg
           ...
Normally, the initscript will mount securityfs if it has not already
been done.
AppArmor also restricts what privileged operations a confined process
may execute, even if the process is running as root. A confined process
cannot call the following system calls:
        create_module(2) delete_module(2) init_module(2) ioperm(2)
        iopl(2) mount(2) umount(2) ptrace(2) reboot(2) setdomainname(2)
        sethostname(2) swapoff(2) swapon(2) sysctl(2)
A confined process can not call mknod(2) to create character or block devices.
ERRORS 
When a confined process tries to access a file it does not have permission
to access, the kernel will report a message to klogd, similar to:
        AppArmor: REJECTING x access to /bin/bash (irssi(2667)
          profile /usr/local/bin/irssi active /usr/local/bin/irssi)
        AppArmor: REJECTING r access to /home/sarnold (mozilla-bin(3029)
          profile /usr/lib/mozilla-1.4/mozilla-bin active
          /usr/lib/mozilla-1.4/mozilla-bin)
        AppArmor: REJECTING rw access to /dev/pts/4 (sh(1721)
          profile /usr/bin/crontab active /usr/bin/crontab)
The permissions requested by the process are immediately after
REJECTING. The ``name'' and process id of the running program are reported,
as well as the profile name and any ``hat'' that may be active. (``Name''
is in quotes, because the process name is limited to 15 bytes; it is the
same as reported through the Berkeley process accounting.) If no hat is
active (see 
change_hat(2)) then the profile name is printed for ``active''.
For confined processes running under a profile that has been loaded in 
complain mode, enforcement will not take place and the log messages 
reported to klogd will be of the form:
        AppArmor: PERMITTING r access to /root/.viminfo (vi(1272) 
                profile /bin/vim active /bin/vim)
        AppArmor: PERMITTING w access to /root/.viminfo.tmp (vi(1272) 
                profile /bin/vim active /bin/vim)
        AppArmor: PERMITTING wl access to /root/.viminfo (vi(1272) 
                profile /bin/vim active /bin/vim)
        AppArmor: PERMITTING rwl access to /root/.viminfo.tmp (vi(1272) 
                profile /bin/vim active /bin/vim)
        AppArmor: PERMITTING w access to /root/.viminfo (vi(1272) 
                profile /bin/vim active /bin/vim)
FILES 
/etc/init.d/boot.apparmor /etc/apparmor.d/ /usr/share/vim/current/syntax/apparmor.vim /lib/apparmor/ 
SEE ALSO 
apparmor_parser(8), change_hat(2), apparmor.d(5),
subdomain.conf(5), autodep(1), clean(1), apparmor.vim(5),
unconfined(8), enforce(1), complain(1), and
http://forge.novell.com/modules/xfmod/project/?apparmorhttp://forge.novell.com/modules/xfmod/project/ .
 NAME 